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THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY. By Arthur R. 1.vJ.iller. Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: The University of Michigan Press. 1971. Pp. 325. $7.95. 
In spite of the successful adjustment man has made to the machine 
in many contexts, it would be foolish not to recognize . . . [the ef-
fect] that certain applications of the computer may have on that 
elusive value we call "personal privacy." [p. 3.] 
This book ... will not simply catalog the great strides being taken 
in the computer world or goggle over the predictions and projec-
tions of the scientific community's enthusiasts. Rather, its aim is to 
explore some of the ways in which information technology is alter-
ing basic patterns in our daily life and to evaluate the responses 
being made by the law, government, industry, and other institu-
tions .... [p. 2.] 
In these words Arthur R. Miller defines the task of The Assault 
on Privacy, a task the book carries out with a systematic, machine-
like efficiency. While The Assault on Privacy is an unmistakable call 
to arms against a descending "dossier dictatorship," it avoids the 
strident generalizations and glib platitudes that often envelop works 
on the emotion-laden subject of privacy. Even as he trots out the 
familiar hypothetical parade of horribles,1 Professor Miller dem-
onstrates an admirable restraint and sense of perspective. Combining 
these features with the inexhaustible research of a true scholastic 
virtuoso, Professor Miller's book demands recognition as a genuinely 
outstanding contribution to the field of privacy protection.2 
One of the most impressive aspects of the small volume is the 
extensive documentation that makes it an invaluable reference work. 
[n order to give his assertions the tone of conclusive authority, 
Professor Miller has combed thousands of pages of congressional 
hearings, hundreds of periodicals and books by computerists, social 
scientists, and legal analysts, and the complete works of Shakespeare 
-all presumably without the aid of a computer.3 While his insis-
t. No current work on privacy is complete without some catalog of the awful 
potential of modem surveillance technology. Professor Miller, for example, points out 
that it is possible to monitor a human being with sensors that can reveal his activities 
and emotions and that computer technology is such that information contained in a 
twenty-page dossier on every American could be stored for almost instant retrieval on 
one computer tape (pp. 12, 45-46). 
2. In the opinion of the reviewer this is one of three important books in the 
privacy field. THE EAVESDROPPERS, by S. Dash, R. Schwartz & R. Knowlton (1959), 
sounded the first warning bell against the growing capabilities of electronic surveillance 
and was a major impetus to the first United States Supreme Court rejection of 
electronically seized evidence (Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)). The 
other major work is Alan '\\Testin's complete treatise, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). 
3. It is as if Professor Miller commanded a small army of researchers, but of 
course that would be impossible in today's tight budget situation. 
[ 1389] 
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tence on commencing each subsection of the book with a quotation, 
often of esoteric origin, sometimes seems a little pushy,4 one is in-
clined to forgive him for this small vanity in view of the end product. 
From his description of computer technology and terminology to his 
review and analysis of the relevant law, Professor Miller convinces 
his reader that he knows what he is talking about. 
In substance, the book argues that privacy is threatened by the 
growing use of computer technology and that safeguards are re-
quired if we are to limit the detrimental aspect of these omnipotent, 
omniscient tools. 
[I]he computer, with its insatiable appetite for information, its 
image of infallibility, and its inability to forget anything that has 
been stored in it, may become the heart of a surveillance system 
that will tum society into a transparent world in which our homes, 
our finances, and our associations will be bared to a wide range of 
casual observers, including the morbidly curious and the maliciously 
or commercially intrusive. [p. 3.] 
One problem in protecting privacy from the probing button 
pushers of computer-based services is the apparent willingness of 
millions of citizens to trade personal information for the advan-
tage of the issuance of credit, welfare payments, insurance, and the 
like. These institutional benefits are conferred only after machines 
have digested and analyzed large amounts of private data that must 
be supplied by the applicant, and getting the consent of the appli-
cant to supply such data has presented no serious problem. Assum-
ing, as Professor Miller does, the desirability and continued vitality 
of data-based services, the question becomes one of regulation rather 
than elimination. To use Miller's dimpled turn of a phrase, the 
question is, How to live with the computer? 
l. CONTROLLING THE USE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION 
The thrust of Miller's proposals in this area focuses upon limit-
ing the use of private data as opposed to its acquisition. 5 His use-
oriented regulations revolve around the premise that personal 
information surrendered for a particular purpose and to a limited 
audience (e.g., credit data given to a bank for purposes of a loan) 
should not be used for any other purpose or seen by any other 
audience (e.g., the credit data should not be made available to po-
4 For esoteric sources, some all-time favorites can be found in THE AssAULT ON 
PRIVACY. Among the special gems are a limerick from the Hamilton College Alumni 
Review (p. 105); a quote from Viscount Buckmaster's Introduction to A. P. Herbert's 
UNCOMMON LAw (p. 169); and a relevant word from Pope Pius XII in a speech delivered 
to the Congress of the International Association of Applied Psychology (p. 216). 
5. For a laboring of this distinction, see Josephson, Book Review, 15 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1586, 1590-93 (1968). 
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tential employers). While this position is rooted in the traditional 
definition of privacy-the ability of a person to control the dis-
semination of information about himself-it is one that has not 
fared well in court. Therefore, the legal problems involved in such 
proposals do merit some attention. 
Of particular relevance is the United States Supreme Court's 
handling of the unauthorized use of private information by an in-
formant posing as a friend, co-conspirator, or confidant. Whether 
the informant utilizes a tape recorder, as in Lopez v. United States6 
and Osborn v. United States,1 or merely serves as a human conduit 
to the police, as in Hoffa v. United States,8 the Court has consistently 
held that once information is freely given, the giver loses his right 
to control its further use. The rationale of this result is that by choos-
ing to reveal private information one assumes the risk that a confi-
dant will betray him, and he will not be heard to protest the 
consequences of his misplaced confidence. Implicit in this holding is 
the theory that when information is released to another it is done 
wholly and unconditionally, regardless of the intentions of the 
speaker. Like the squeezing of toothpaste out of the tube, the reve-
lation of private information is irrevocable. 
It can be argued that the later case of Katz v. United States,9 
which defined constitutionally protected privacy in terms of one's 
"reasonable expectations," ought to modify these holdings and at 
least require an ad hoc determination of whether the speaker could 
have "reasonably expected" a particular confidant to transmit the 
information to the police. It is one thing to say that a night club pro-
prietor could reasonably expect an IRS agent to reject a bribe and 
report the incident to his superiors,10 and quite another to apply the 
same theory to a long-time friend and business associate.11 Thus, 
Katz could be read to suggest that a person assumes the risk of 
betrayal only when he has no reasonable expectation of privacy, that 
careful selection of one's confidants is all that is required to invoke 
the protections of the fourth amendment. This is not, however, the 
present interpretation of the Katz case, and the reluctance of the 
courts to extend the scope of privacy and limit the use of conversa-
tions in the informant area ought to be considered in the context 
of restricting the use of voluntarily revealed personal data in the 
computer privacy setting. 
Why should a man assume the risk that one who poses as his 
6. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
7, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
8. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
10. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
11. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
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friend will abuse his trust and misuse information given him and yet 
not assume the same risk when dealing with an impersonal service 
organization? In terms of both the knmvn risks and one's reasonable 
expectations, the arguments for a loss of control over personal in-
formation are stronger in the data-gathering context than in the 
court-considered informant situation. One who fills out a form or 
application as a condition precedent to a benefit he seeks knows that 
the information supplied may be read, checked, and examined by 
a number of strangers from clerks to investigators and programmers. 
By the test of Lopez and Katz the applicant has no reasonable ex-
pectation that these persons will act in good faith or with the utmost 
discretion, and he could be deemed to assume the risk that either the 
institution or its functionaries will use the information for other 
purposes. Furthermore, when the government attempts to limit the 
way in which certain information can be disseminated, there are 
significant free speech considerations to be met. If a credit company 
employee is, in essence, sworn to secrecy, may he be enjoined from 
testifying in court as well as gossiping to a friend? While such a 
problem is not insuperable, it is suggestive of the difficulties im-
plicit in legislative attempts to limit the use of information. 
The cases refusing to invoke the right of privacy in a constitu-
tional sense are not applicable to legislative action that seeks to 
grant greater individual protections than the minimum standards set 
forth by the Supreme Court. This point is particularly evident as 
one shifts the focus from a criminal investigation context (in which 
the public interest in obtaining and using private information is 
somewhat compelling) to the powers of civil service-oriented insti-
tutions. 
In addition, the rationale of the Lopez and Katz decisions is sub-
ject to direct frontal attack. The concept of viewing privacy in 
terms of one's reasonable expectations is laden with the seeds of self-
destruction. If the question of privacy entails only the protection of 
one's actual expectations, without regard to justifiable claims for 
greater protection, the right of privacy will shrink in direct propor-
tion to the expansion of surveillance practices. By disclaimer or by 
formal notice, the private credit company or the governmental 
agency could enlarge its right to use information merely by announc-
ing its intention to do so. The readiness of persons to sign contracts 
with clauses that authorize extensive investigation and waive the 
signer's right to assert legislatively granted privileges demonstrates 
the ease with which individuals can be induced to barter their pri-
vacy protections for a present benefit. Thus, the implication of the 
reasonable expectation doctrine into the computer privacy area could 
sanction any use the information-gathering organization chose to 
make of personal data. 
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Finally, precedent for the control of private information can be 
found in the concept of legally protected privileges. Such privileges 
traditionally allow a client, a patient, or a penitent to prevent his 
attorney, doctor, or minister from revealing information transmitted 
in confidence in the course of their special relationship. It is not 
inconceivable that a similar privilege could be granted to the com-
munication between a beneficiary (e.g., credit or welfare applicant) 
and his intended benefactor. 
II. CHANGING CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY 
The direct dangers to privacy posed by insensitive computer 
operators may be minimized by careful regulation of the use of col-
lected personal data. However, this approach assumes that the broad 
availability and distribution of the type of personal information in-
volved is socially deleterious, an assumption subject to challenge. 
Professor Miller points out that 
the public may lose its sense of the private if large-scale transfers and 
dissemination of personal information become common .... People 
accustomed to the revelation of sensitive personal data eventually 
may define most information as public and place it beyond the law's 
protection. [p. 181.] 
This observation reveals the fact that privacy is a changing concept 
that reflects social expectations. What is private at one time in his-
tory may be the subject of ostentatious exposure at another.12 These 
changes result from an evolutionary modification of basic attitudes 
that are neither right nor ·wrong; they are merely different. Conse-
quently, the fact that the public sense of privacy is being changed by 
the impact of computer technology may be part of a natural and 
healthy adaptation to an electronic era. In fact, this adaptation 
phenomenon may contain the solution to some of the negative im-
plications of data surveillance. As the public becomes accustomed to 
the exposure of "personal" information, it is likely that the morbid 
curiosity of the gossip mongers will become sated13 and the anx.iety 
accompanying revelation will gradually disappear. In a world in 
12. A short look at contemporary history illustrates the point. At the turn of the 
century the entire female body was a "no-peeking'' preserve. The pulchritude of the 
ankle, calf, and thigh was carefully hidden as part of the private domain reserved for 
the good lady's husband. The "Peeping Tom" who stole a glimpse of a woman in a 
state of semi-undress truly violated that woman's privacy. Today, semi-nudity is a 
mode of dress which reflects a generation gap in privacy concepts. The point is that 
nothing is inherently private, that privacy reflects the mores of changing times. 
13. The recent e.xperience in Denmark with the Copenhagen sex shows wherein 
performers engaged in all forms of sexual activity on stage demonstrates how quickly 
the "excitingly different" can become gross exhibitionism. The triumph of the 
"Peeping" or "Listening" Tom is to see or hear something he is not supposed to 
witness. Take away the prohibition and you remove the incentive. 
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which everyone has access to the petty details of the lives of his 
neighbors, human foibles and misadventures become small in their 
proper perspective. In this light it may not be clear that the govern-
ment ought to interfere by artificially reinforcing particular dispos-
able notions of privacy.H 
Much of the demand for privacy is a conditioned response. It 
can be posited that the sense of privacy is basically a product of 
the desire to defend oneself from public attitudes that do not coin-
cide ·with certain personal behavior, that one seeks to keep private 
only that information that can harm him if disclosed. Privacy allows 
a person to project an image that is not a true reflection of his 
thoughts and conduct. The selection of the desired image and, conse-
quently, the information to be kept from the public eye are usually 
a direct result of contemporary social norms. Thus, the kinds of 
things regarded as private vary according to acceptable social stan-
dards. Sexual behavior, for example, is not universally viewed as an 
activity that is to be blanketed by concepts of privacy. Even within 
the "civilized" nations there is a broad disparity in the type of in-
formation that is viewed as private and that which is viewed as not. 
A young unmarried woman in Sweden does not suffer a pang of 
discomfort if her employer learns she is living with her boy friend, 
while her Italian counterpart might feel that her private world has 
been invaded by such a disclosure. The difference is not related to 
the inherent moral quality of the conduct but to the capacity of the 
revealed fact to cause damage. 
The assumption that the data accumulation of the computer vio-
lates privacy may also be attacked on the ground that the kind of 
information collected is not really private in nature. While the typi-
cal pro-privacy ploy is to hypothesize a surveillance device in the 
bedroom, recording and reporting the most intimate activities, the 
reality is that the type of information generally involved is already 
semi-public. For example, what a person earns is known by literally 
dozens of comparative strangers, his employer, the payroll clerk, 
those who cash the check, his family, his creditors, tax men, and often 
co-workers. Similarly, an individual's employment experience or 
contact with the law is a matter of record. The intrusiveness of the 
complete dossier comes from its ability to piece together hundreds 
of known facts into a total revealing picture. It is a case in which 
the sum is greater than its component parts.15 The right to privacy 
14. In purporting to defend a person's prerogative to preserve the privacy of 
primarily nonpernicious information, perhaps Professor Miller's proposals only protect 
his personal sense of propriety premised upon outmoded and artificial precepts. 
15. For example, Professor Miller points out that the average person leaves clear 
tracks of his life through such things as airline and hotel reservations, credit card 
slips, canceled checks, and telephone records. However, only the detective who has 
access to all the information can accurately determine the subject's spending habits, 
his associations and, at the same time, reconstruct his activities. 
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in this context is nothing more than the right to prevent available, 
freely given, nonintimate information from being collected and 
stored in one place. In essence, as society's detective capacities be-
come efficient enough to evince an undeniable profile of an indi-
vidual, the demand to disarm the detective increases. But, at the 
very least, it can be argued, the type of "privacy invasion" ac-
complished by information-storing computers is of a different di-
mension than that caused by the use of surveillance devices that 
without consent intrude upon one's solitude or intimate relations. 
Moreover, the alteration of traditional notions of privacy may be 
part of a psychologically healthy movement to "tell it like it is." 
Hypocritical social values are often spawned and perpetuated behind 
a curtain of privacy. The shame implied by the need to conceal true 
facts and feelings may reflect a denial of the intrinsic worth of man's 
individuality. While it has been suggested that privacy is an aspect 
of human dignity,16 a more accurate perspective may reveal it as 
little more than an escape hatch from the vengeance of an intolerant 
society that accords no respect to the individual for what he is. If 
society were truly to acknowledge and nurture human dignity, the 
concept of privacy might become superfluous.17 
The response to these arguments that minimize the significance 
of computers to the maintenance of privacy values is based more on 
value judgments than on logic. To ignore such judgments simply 
because they do not represent immutable truths misses the whole 
point of the privacy concept. While it is true that man can be 
conditioned out of the urge for privacy as it relates to specific situa-
tions, it is not likely that he can be led to forgo all manner of pri-
vate life. As Alan Westin has indicated, privacy is closely related 
to the concept of personal autonomy that is an instinctive urge of 
all men.18 The suggestion that man should be allowed to adapt to a 
changing world in which privacy is discarded is really quite sophistic. 
16. See Blaustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964). 
17. A homosexual under present values may live in constant peril of exposure. To 
him privacy is crucial to conceal or disguise every hint of his social aberration. How-
ever, if the homosexual were to be accepted for his intrinsic worth as a person with 
no regard to his personal sexual appetites, he could live freely and unself•consciously 
without the need for the constantly closed door. 
18. The relevant remark did not escape Professor Miller's optical scanner. A. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 34 (1967), is quoted as follows: 
[D]evelopment of individuality is particularly important in democratic societies, 
since quality of independent thought, diversity of views, and nonconformity are 
considered desirable traits for individuals. Such independence requires time for 
sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation and practice in 
thought and conduct, without fear of ridicule or penalty, and for the opportunity 
to alter opinions before making them public. The individual's sense that it is he 
who decides when to 'go public' is a crucial aspect of his feeling of autonomy. 
Without such time for incubation and growth, through privacy, many ideas and 
positions would be launched into the world with dangerous prematurity. [p. 49.] 
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Man can also adapt to the industrial rape of the environment and in 
a generation view a polluted stream without a "pang of discomfort." 
The question raised by The Assault on Privacy is, Should he adapt 
or fight? It is certainly a valid question and one that must be an-
swered before the decision becomes irrelevant. 
With regard to the argument that semi-public information should 
not fall within the ambit of privacy protection, one must return to 
the personal autonomy aspects of human psychology. While thou-
sands of people and organizations may know separate facts about an 
individual, so long as there is no centralization of these facts no 
one person or organization has the power to use the total informa-
tion package to the individual's disadvantage. As Professor Miller 
puts it: 
[W]hen an individual is deprived of control over the spigot that 
governs the fl.ow of information pertaining to him, in some measure 
he becomes subservient to those people and institutions that are able 
to manipulate it. [P. 25.] 
Although freedom from the manipulation of semi-public informa-
tion may be a facet of privacy distinct from those that relate to an 
individual's intimate relations and moments of self-searching soli-
tude, it is cut from the same stone and merits careful concern. 
The "tell it like it is" argument is a bit more facile. There can 
be no question that privacy is, among other things, a defense against 
the intolerances of society, and that the more intolerant the society 
the greater is the need for the shelter of secrecy. However, history 
has yet to produce the civilization without its biases and prejudices. 
In fact, the right to form negative opinions of those who diverge 
from deeply held moral values may be as important to a free society 
as the right of privacy itself. In the last analysis the issue should be 
one of personal choice, not public commandment. If an individual 
homosexual, for instance, chooses to run the gantlet of social dis-
approval and confront the injustice directly by making his life pub-
lic, he should certainly be free to do so. It is not clear, however, that 
his more timid and psychologically frail counterparts ought to be 
drafted into the battle by a public policy that deprives them of their 
shields of privacy. If the key to privacy is individuality, the decision 
to dispense with privacy ought to be left in the hands of the indi-
vidual. 
III. ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 
Another major danger of widespread computer surveillance 
pointed out in The Assault on Privacy really has nothing to do with 
privacy per se. This danger relates to the unjustified harm that can 
be done to a person who has inaccurate or misleading information in 
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his file. Once the right to acquire and use personal information is 
acknowledged, the way in which the data are collected and recorded 
becomes vital. 
Professor Miller points out, with calculated effect, that a com-
mon source of credit information gathering is neighborhood gossip. 
This secondhand, often malicious information is translated into 
cold, hard-looking data in a computer printout, a process which 
illustrates what Miller refers to as the GIGO principle (Garbage In, 
Gospel Out). Furthermore, accurate but incomplete information 
also subjects the individual to contextual inaccuracies that distort the 
truth. Both of these dangers may be effectively mitigated by imposing 
tort liability upon those who cause harm through the use of inaccu-
rate or misleading information, and by requiring that each data-
subect be given notice of information contained in his file and an 
opportunity to set the record straight. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Assault on Privacy is a successful book. While it makes no 
attempt to cope with all the philosophical problems of privacy, it 
defines precisely the actual and threatened impact of computer tech-
nology on common concepts of privacy. By providing an explicit 
description of the present state of the problem and innumerable 
examples of what could happen, Professor Miller informs his reader 
of the considerations and consequences of modern technological de-
velopments. While The Assault on Privacy reveals the author's own 
biases, it supplies enough information to allow independent rational 
judgment. No more can be expected of a work of this kind. 
:Michael S. Josephson 
Associate Professor of Law, 
Wayne State University 
